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Abstract 
11 
Soren Kierkegaard's Philosophical Fragments and Concluding Unscientific Postscript 
have been extremely impactful in 20th century Western theological and philosophical thought. In 
a similar manner, St. John Klimakos, from whom Kierkegaard derives the pseudonym Johannes 
Climacus, who wrote The Ladder of Divine Ascent, is one of the most "studied, copied, and 
translated" books in Eastern Christendom. Johannes Climacus, the pseudonym for the two 
Kierkegaard works above, is a theological/philosophical opponent to Hegelian thought. St. John 
Klimakos, a real person, is a 6th century monk who hopes to assist monks on their journey to 
God with a manual about the thirty steps of a ladder. While many ( e.g. Muench, Barret, and 
Vipperman) have written on who Soren Kierkegaard's Johannes Climacus is as a pseudonymous 
author, no one has endeavored to look at the text Kierkegaard derives his pseudonym from. This 
paper gives a brief overview on the current Johannes Climacus scholarship and summarizes the 
Fragment and The Ladder of Divine Ascent. After it will specifically look at five shared ideas 
between the two works: an interlocutor, humility, the moment, indirect communication, and 
complicatedness in soteriology. Having displayed the shared themes, it concludes that St. John 
Klimalrns did indeed have an impact on Soren Kierkegaard's Johannes Climacus. Finally it ends 
with a rereading of the pseudonym Johannes Climacus and a new way of seeing Soren 
Kierkegaard. Climacus, having shared so many themes with Klimakos, can be seen as having 
monastic father purposes and uses his philosophical methods to .bring people a real experience 
with God. Soren Kierkegaard, being very alike to his own pseudonym Johannes Climacus, may 
be viewed as monk intent on reintroducing Christianity into Denmark. 
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Introduction 
Soren Kierkegaard's Philosophical Fragments and Concluding Unscientific Postscript 
have been extremely impactful in 20th century Western theological and philosophical thought, 
especially with Karl Barth. In a similar manner, St. John Klimakos 1, who wrote The Ladder of 
Divine Ascent2, is one of the most "studied, copied, and translated" books in Eastern 
Christendom. 3 Kierkegaard derives the pseudonym Johannes Climacus from him. Johannes 
Climacus, the pseudonym for the two Kierkegaard works above, is a theological/philosophical 
opponent to Hegelian thought. He searches for authentic inwardness while claiming that 
subjectivity is truth. St. John Klimakos, a real person, is a 6th century monk who hopes to assist 
monks on their journey to God with a manual about the thirty steps of a ladder. At face value it 
appears that the authors have little to nothing in common, being separated by over a thousand 
years and seeming to have no similar purpose. 
I 
However, Kierkegaard's pseudonym in the works above is unique. Climacus is a 
pseudonym whose origin is derived from an actual person who wrote a book Kierkegaard read. A 
majority of authors (e.g. Muench, Mulhall, Vipperman, Barrett, etc.) writing currently on 
Kierkegaard's Johannes Climacus recognize the origin of the pseudonym, but few, if any, have 
investigated the influence ofKlimakos' Ladder on Kierkegaard's Climacus' writing, or purpose, 
in his Fragment and Postscript. There are multiple similarities between Klimakos' .Ladder and 
Climacus' Fragment and Postscript, thus, showing the impact ofKlimakos on Climacus: a 
1 Throughout this paper I will refer to the writer of the Ladder of Divine Ascent (Ladder) as Klimakos and the 
pseudonym of the Philosophical Fragments (PF) and Concluding Unscientific Postscript (CUP) as Climacus. For 
reference, I am using the Hong's translation of Kierkegaard's works and Luibheid's and Russell's translation for the 
Ladder. 
2 In the original greek the title runs KAtµux TOO 11upuosfoou, but Kierkegaard read the latin translation: Scala 
Paradisi. 
3 Ladder 1 
constructed interlocutor in the Fragment, an interest in the consideration of death, and a 
continued disagreement with monastic life in the Postscript, and throughout Kierkegaard's 
journals. While I believe there are common literary themes in both the Fragment and the 
Postscript with the Ladder, I will only be referring to the Fragment in this essay. Recognizing 
these shared themes supports my claim that Klimakos influenced Kierkegaard's Climacus. 
Seeing this influence leads to a richer reading of Kierkegaard's work and an overall better 
understanding of who Johannes Climacus is as a pseudonym and Kierkegaard's purpose as a 
writer in general. 
2 
Below I will provide a brief overview of secondary writers' thoughts on the identity of 
Johannes Climacus. After this, short sununaries of the The Ladder of Divine Ascent and 
Philosophical Fragments are given. Then, I will give evidence of the Ladder's influence in 
Kierkegaard's life by examining his journals and follow with a discussion of literary themes, 
citing textual similarities found in both Klimakos' and Climacus' work. Specifically, I will look 
at the constructed interlocutor, the "moment" (i.e. an interaction with God), epistemic humility, 
and indirect communication in the Fragment. After this, I will address and reconcile the apparent 
conflict between the works concerning soteriology, shining further light on the influence of 
Klimakos on Climacus. Next, I will argue that recognizing these similarities provides an 
enriched reading of Kierkegaard's Fragment. Climacus is. not just a humorist disinterestedly 
seeking solutions to Christian paradoxes, but a monk who hopes to teach his audience what a 
Christian ought to believe and how one can become more of a Christian. Finally, I will argue that 
by reading Climacus in this way, and by noting Kierkegaard's similarities with Climacus, one 
could interpret Kierkegaard as a monk teaching nominal Christians what is true Christianity. 
3 
Who is Climacus? 
There are a variety of opinions on the self-proclaimed humorist4, who does not wish to 
become a Christian, 5 but desires to know how to become one. The majority of the scholarship 
treats Climacus as what Climacus claims himself to be: a humorist intent on seeking how to 
become a Christian. However, there is some tension in the Kierkegaardian corpus. While 
Climacus is the author of the Fragment and the Postscript, he is also author of Johannes 
Climacus, or De Omnibus Dubitandum Est.6 In the above works, Climacus appears as a person 
trying to complicate Christianity by asking the question in the Fragment, "Can a historical point 
of departure be given for an eternal consciousness?" 7 Later he asks in the Postscript, "How can I 
Johannes Climacus, share in the happiness that Christianity promises?" 8 with the intent of 
fulfilling a promise made in the Fragment ( even though he does not feel indebted to do so). 9 In 
,!he unpublished De Omnibus, he is a young student whose idea of"coherent thinking was a sea/a 
paradisi," 10 but later falls into doubt because of the above title (De Omnibus Dubitandum Est 
translated is everything must be doubted). In the published works, Climacus is not a student, but 
an older, self-identified humorist intent on complicating Christianity. However, in the earlier, 
unpublished work, Climacus is a student faced with losing his reason and faith due to modem 
skeptical philosophy. So, here lies the tension in the pseudonymous authorship: is Climacus a 
4 "I am not a religious person but simply and solely a humorist." CUP 501 
5 CUP 587 
6 De Omnibus Dubitandum Est is an unpublished work by Soren Kierkegaard written in 1842-1843. It comes before 
both the Fragment (by 2 years) and the Postscript (by 4 years), 
7 PF I 
8 CUP 17 
9 CUP 9: "Therefore I have not felt bound by that promise, even though from the beginning it was my intent to fulfill 
it and the prerequisites were already on hand concurrently with the promise!' 
IO PF 119 
young student or a humorist? Further, was he once a young student who became a humorist? Or 
are the two Climacus' entirely different? 
4 
McKinnon has clearly demonstrated 11 that most of Kierkegaard's pseudonymous works 
(not just the ones authored by Climacus) appear to be from different hands, just as he intended. 12 
Ferreira, in her overview of Kierkegaard's use of pseudonyms, states that even though the 
pseudonyms nuance the authorship, care must be taken to not completely discount them. 13 
Kierkegaard may use a pseudonym for the sake of indirect communication and presenting a 
different perspective on a stage of life. To think the pseudonymous authors offer only a small 
side of Kierkegaard is not entirdy true. Similarly untrue is the thought that the accumulation of 
the pseudonymous works fully and accurately represent Kierkegaard. It is extremely difficult to 
avoid seeing Kierkegaard's Christianity in many of the pseudonyms: S. Kierkegaard, Anti-
Climacus, and especially Johannes Climacus. 14 While not all have recognized Climacus' 
Christinaity, almost all scholarship makes note of the pseudonyms monastic origin. 
Concerning the Fragment's author, Ferreira recognizes that Climacus derives from 
Klimakos, then, elaborates that the Fragmel1f follows Fear and Trembling, authored by Johannes 
de Silentio, which she thinks makes multiple ironic statements. 15 Where Silentio will put his faith 
in God almost blindly, Climacus uses arguments to reach God. Allison also recognizes the 
monastic origin ofClimacus' name, but attributes Kierkegaard's use ofit as a notion of climax. 
11 McKinnon analyzed vocabulary and syntax in Kierkegaard's pseudonymous works, self-titled books, and personal 
writings. 
12 Alastair McKinnon, "Kierkegaard's Pseudonyms: A New Hierarchy," American Philosophical Quarterly 6, no. 2 
(1969):120, accessed April 4, 2018, http://www.jstor.org/stable/20009297. 
13 Jamie M. Ferreira, Kierkegaard, (Malden: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), 8. 
14 This paper only summarizes the major scholarship that has been done on Kierekgaard's pseudonyms for the sake 
of expediency and to focus on the origin/scholarship on Climacus'. 
15 Ferreira, Kierkegaard, 8. 
An ascent from human categories (the aesthetic) to the divine categories (the religious). 16 He 
concludes that Climacus represents Kierkegaard's own attitude during his student days at the 
university. 
5 
Lowrie, one of the most prominent Kierkegaardian biographers, withholds judgment on 
who Climacus is, but suggests that Kierkegaard's contemporaries were aware ofKlimakos' 
work. Hannay, another great biographer, attempts to bridge the gap between the author of the 
Fragment, the Postscript, and the author of De Omnibus Dubitandum Est: "Who better to 
prepare the way to showing the requirements of faith than one who has grasped the true scope of 
its opposite, doubt?" 17 He references Kierkegaard's' journals for greater understanding: "Hegel is 
a Johannes Climacus, who did not, like the giants, storm the heavens by setting mountain upon 
mountain, but entered by means of his syllogisms." 18 Hanney elaborates that during the autumn 
and winter of 1838, Kierkegaard's journals showed immense interest in protecting Christianity. 
This leaves him to conclude that, "Johannes Climacus is less the real Kierkegaard in disguise 
,than a name given to a fictive character with a point of view which someone might genuinely 
adopt ... but he [Kierkegaard] is perfectly capable of adopting the philosophical stance 
himself." 19 Hanney believes the authors of both texts are the same throughout, and Kierkegaard 
would somewhat agree, if not entirely, with Climacus on philosophical stances. 
Muench, who has written extensively on Climacus' authorship, does not agree in regard 
to the authors being the same. He sees Johannes Climacus, at least the Climacus of the Fragment 
and Postscript, as a Socratic figure. He categories the journal quotation above (Hegel ... 
16Henry E. Allison, "Christianity and Nonsense," The Review of Metaphysics, 20, no. 3 (2007): 454. 
17 Alastair Hannay, Kierkegaard (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 230. 
18 JP 335 
19 Alastair Hannay, Kierkegaard, 229. 
6 
syllogisms), the author of De Omnibus, and the author of the two other works. The first Climacus 
is a phrase that someone might use when suffering from placing their trust in speculative 
philosophy. Muench think that Kierkegaard thinks that Hegel is foolish in thinking he can reach 
heaven through reason just as any 'Johannes Climacus'. 20 The author of De Omnibus is simply a 
young student who wishes to climb a ladder, a scala paradisi, ofthought. 21 Finally, the author of 
the Fragment and Postscript is someone who adopts a Socratic stance with the intention of 
drawing in his reader into confusion and helping them give up a Hegelian-style of doing 
philosophy. 22 Since a young doubter and a Socratic teacher differ not only in age but also in task 
and mindset, Muench concludes in the same vein as Evans that there is no real basis for 
assuming that the subject of De Omnibus is the same as the author of the Fragment or the 
Postscript. 23 Vipperman, another Climacus commentator, in the same line as Muench, agrees that 
Climacus exonerates Socrates in his revocation because "he is not able to become a Christian yet, 
and unlike many people around him who think that they have this ability and do not, Climacus 
knows what he does not know." 24 Climacus from De Omnibus may share some views with 
Climacus from the Fragment and Postscript, but the authors are different in the corpus. 
Barrett offers a very different opinion on the identity of Climacus. He does not address 
the author of De Omnibus, unlike Muench. Barret, who has written most recently on this issue, 
states that Climacus is not a single stance, but the sight of multiple authorial dynamics hoping to 
20Paul Muench, "Kierkegaard's Socratic Pseudonym: A Profile of Joharmes Climacus," In Kierkegaard's Concluding 
Unscientific Postscript, 33. doi:10.1017/cbo9780511782008.003. 
21 Paul Muench, Kierkegaard's Socratic Task. (Dissertation: University of Pittsburgh, 2006), 82. 
22Paul Muench, "Understanding Kierkegaard's Joharmes Climacus in the Postscript," In Kierkegaard Studies 
Yearbook 2007, 432. doi: I 0.1515/9783110192926.2.424 
23 Paul Muench, Kierkegaard's Socratic Task, 81. 
24Kristy Vipperman, "Climacus the (multi-dimensional) Humorist: Interpreting 'An Understanding with the 
Reader'," Religious Studies 35, no. 3 (1999): 354. doi:10.1017/s003441259900493x. 
7 
expose the vacancy ofrelying upon reason alone to attain human fulfillment. 25 At one point 
Climacus does not assert any spiritual authority, but elsewhere he is heavily invested in 
soteriology and infant baptism. In other places, Climacus displays a viewpoint that does not fully 
embrace the themes 26 of Christianity so that he may destabilize the reader, leading them into 
openness. 27 Barrett concludes that "The complexity and ambiguity ofClimacus' persona is a 
major component of Kierkegaard's strategy of indirect communication," 28 and which of the 
aspects of the persona are emphasized is "finally up to the reader." 29 Climacus, and who he is, 
becomes reader dependent. 
While the identity ofClimacus is not the direct subject of this paper, it will become 
useful later in addressing Klimakos' influence on Climacus. All the scholars above have done a 
dutiful job engaging with the Fragment and Postscript; however, none of them, aside from a 
_simple footnote recognizing the origin of Climacus, have looked at Klimakos' text itself to see if 
.. there are similarities between it and Kierkegaard's work. 3° Climacus' name, as some have 
claimed, could simply reinforce that the author is syllogistic in his reasoning and hopes to reach 
heaven. However, this does not account for Kierkegaard's references to Klimakos in 1839 and 
1849. It refuses to see the name itself, "Climacus", as anything more than wordplay, instead of 
reference to a former author. 
25Lee C. Barrett, "Johannes Climacus: Humorist, Dialectician, and Gadfly," in Kierkegaard's Pseudonyms, ed. By 
Katalin Nun and Jon Stewart, (Surrey: Ashgate, 2015), 117. 
26 Lee C. Barrett, "Johannes Climacus: Humorist, Dialectician, and Gadfly,"125. 
27 Ibid 123. 
28 Ibid 137. 
29 Ibid 138. 
30 The Hong's footnote in their "Historical Introduction" is the greatest investigation into Climacus' textual origin: 
''References to Climacus appear in W.M.L. de Wette's Loerebog i den christelige Soedeloere, tr. C. E. Sharling 
(Copenhagen: 1835), pp. 135, 138, 139. Kierkegaard owned that volume (ASKE 871) and used it in preparing for 
his final university examinations in 1839." PF ix. 
8 
There are some facts, however, that need to be explained: First, Kierkegaard has read the 
work ofKlimakos' Scala Paradisi, and, as said by Lowrie, it was known in his academic circles. 
Second, even though Kierkegaard harbors a hate for monasticism, he uses a monk's name on his 
most philosophically-focused works. Third, Kierkegaard's Climacus inspires a new pseudonym 
Anti-Climacus.31 Fourth, Clirnacus is unlike the other pseudonyms in that his name references an 
actual person. Fifth, there are similarities between the Ladder and the Fragment, which is the 
subject of this paper. Stating that Kierkegaard's Climacus derives his name from Klimakos 
without any further investigation is too simplistic. 
A chronological perspective demonstrates the evolution of Climacus as pseudonym. In 
1839, while preparing for his final university examinations, Kierkegaard writes that Hegel is a 
Climacus aspiring to reach the heavens by reason-thus showing evidence of having read the 
Ladder. Dabbling with doubt in 1842-43, Kierkegaard writes Johannes Climacus, but never 
publishes the work. In 1844, he sees the opportunity to use Climacus as an author. Ferreira 
accounts for this nicely: 
"Then, lo and behold, one sees a physical copy of the Philosophical Fragments 
signed by S. Kierkegaard; researchers have discovered the draft from the day 
before it went to the printers, at which time it still had Kierkegaard's name as 
author. One seems to come full circle by learning Kierkegaard changed it to be 
authored by Johannes Climacus. It is not clear why he made the change, but the 
shift in signature does suggest that he did not begin by first creating the 
31 Meaning before Climacus not against Climacus. See the Hong's note on PF x. 
9 
pseudonymous author and then writing the book in that distinctive (non-Christian) 
voice."32 
Kierkegaard, already having written down his thoughts, decides to label them as belonging to 
Climacus'. Finally, Klimakos appears in his journal again in 1849, while Anti-Climacus appears 
for the first time while he is writing The Sickness Unto Death and Practice in Christianity: "the 
actual Johannes Climacus (author of Scala Paradisi) says: There are but few saints; ifwe wish to 
become saintly and saved, we must live as do the few." 33 Based upon this evidence, I seek to 
look at Klimakos' work to see the influence on Climacus, and what that influence will reveal 
about Kierkegaard. 
Klimakos' Work and Climacus' Works 
The Ladder a/Divine Ascent is divided into thirty chapters, representative of the life of 
Jesus, and one summary. At the beginning of the book, Klimakos invites his monastic readers to 
take a tough and painful Journey to God with him through a series of steps. After each step up the 
ladder ( e.g. On Exile, On Obedience, On Dispassion), Klimakos ends with an invitation and 
challenge, such as "keep running, athlete, and do not be afraid," 34 or, "Such then is the twentieth 
step. He who has climbed it has received light in his heart. "35 After going through the thirty 
steps, Klimakos ends with an exhortation to his brother to ascend eagerly and let their hearts' 
resolve be to climb. 36 Overall, the book is an ascetical endeavor that focuses on exhorting readers 
to sacrifice themselves and their sins to more fully encounter God. More specifically, as Ware 
says, Klimakos' intention is to have a personal encounter with God, for there is no Christian at 
32Jamire M. Ferreira, Kierkegaard, 9. This is also accounted for in Lowrie's biography and in the introduction to 
Philosophical Fragments by the Hong's. 
33 JP 6362 
34Ladder 120. 
35 Ladder, 198. 
36 Ladder, 291. 
second hand-someone who lives off another's Christian experience. 37 By leading them to a 
moment of personal encounter, 38 Klimakos hopes that the reader will have an experience like 
his:39 
"Let all those coming to this marvelous, tough, and painful-though also 
easy--contest leap, as it were, into a fire, so that a non-material flame may 
take up residence within them." 40 
10 
The man above, who leaves the world to love God, has a fire from the start and it will 
become a bonfire. 41 Klimakos, seeing all other monks struggling, hopes to guide them towards a 
greater faith in God by retelling his marvelous, tough, and painful contest. 
While the Ladder ends with an exhortation, the Philosophical Fragments opens with a 
question. 42 Throughout the book, Climacus is attempting to move away from Plato's idea that 
knowledge comes through recollection. 43 He begins with the learner's paradox: "a person cannot 
possibly seek what he knows ... he cannot seek what he does not know ... because, after all, he 
does not even know what he is supposed to seek."44 On the Socratic viewpoint, Climacus says, 
every man is a midpoint between the infinite and the finite, 45 but it is also the case that the point 
oflearning is "nothing, because in the same moment [one] discover[s] that [ one has known] the 
truth from eternity without knowing it."46 Thus, 
37 Kallistos Ware, introduction to The Ladder of Divine Ascent, 7. 
38Ibid, 10. 
39 Ibid, 8. 
40 Ladder, 76. 
41 Ladder, 76. 
42 "Can a historical point of departure be given for an eternal consciousness?" 
43 PF 14. 
44 PF9 
45 PF 11 
46 PF 13 
"If the situation is to be different, then the moment in time must have such 
decisive significance that for no moment will I be able to forget it, neither 
in time nor in eternity, because the eternal, previously nonexistent, came 
into existence in that moment." 47 
11 
Climacus demands that there must be a decisive moment in time when the learner 
discovers truth. So, Climacus insists that a teacher (i.e. the god48) reveals to the learner that they 
themselves are untruth, for "if the god did not come himself, then everything would remain 
Socratic, we would not have the moment, and we would fail to obtain the paradox." 49 The 
paradox refers the infinite god coming down as man. Climacus uses a "thought-project" to show 
the reader the difference between a rationalized and a revealed religion. 50 The project as he states 
in "The Moral", goes beyond the Socratic with new terms: faith, the consciousness of sin, the 
moment, and the god in time. 51 
In ending these summaries, I ask what can the reader gain from these texts? The monk 
teaches other monks asceticism, while the humorist questions Christian orthodoxy to bring 
inwardness to the masses. At first glance, these texts seem far apart in purpose, style, and literary 
themes. Klimalrns uses stories and exhortations in the form of steps, whereas Climacus uses 
complicated philosophical methods to move away from Platonic epistemology toward the 
uniquely Christian revelation. Where are the similarities, if any? And, if there are, what can one 
gain from knowing them? 
47 PF 13. 
48 In order to maintain authorial originality I will constantly switch the capitalization of god. Climacus only uses 
god while Klimakos uses God. 
49 PF55. 
50 Jamie M. Ferreira, Kierkegaard, 72. 
51 PF 111. 
The Influence of Klimakos on Kierkegaard 
While there are many parallels between the two works, I will begin with more general 
influences St. John Klimakos seems tq have had on Kierkegaard. It was mentioned above that 
Kierkegaard may have read Klimakos' work during his time as a theology student at the 
University, but his journals show a great hatred and disgust for the monastic movement before, 
, 
12 
during, and after the time he wrote the Fragment and Postscript. Before delving into the literary 
themes of the works, I will examine Kierkegaard's relationship with the monastic movement. 
Monasticism and Kierkegaard 
light: 
One of the earliest entries concerning monasticism seems to paint it in a positive 
"In the beginning the monks lived completely outside the world, embattled with 
the world and wearing a special habit so that everyone could recognize them; 
finally they lived in the world, reconciled with it (Jesuits, etc.)." 
July 2, 183652 
However, while seeming to praise the monks, Kierkegaard is beginning to develop a 
belittling sentiment when he says, "so that everyone could recognize them." Later on, he 
will scold the monastic system for taking what should be internally pleasurable and 
exchanging it to an external action, so that everyone may recognize it. 
Kierkegaard, having emolled in theological study in 183053 and completed his 
examination in I 840, may have read or encountered some monastic works, especially The 
52 JP 3805. 
53 "Kierkegaard enrolled at the University of Copenhagen in 1830 but did not complete his studies until 1841 ... 
Kierkegaard entered university in order to study theology but devoted himself to literature and philosophy instead." 
Merold Westphal, "S0ren Kierkegaard, Danish Philosopher," in Encyclopaedia Britaunica November 7,2017 and 
accessed March 24, 2019, https://www.britaunica.com/biography/Soren-Kierkegaard. 
Ladder. But it cannot be doubted that, in a strongly Protestant country, Kierkegaard was 
prejudiced against monks who were neither in the world nor of the world but, as 
demonstrated above, completely outside of it. He displays this same sentiment after the 
writing of De Omnibus but before the Fragment as well: 
"This is how we save religion in our day. We acknowledge with humor the 
world of actuality (for presumably finitude is sin, but not something to 
grieve over), and thus we keep [religion] healthy. We do not enter the 
monastery but become fools in the world." 
n.d. 184354 
Here, Kierkegaard is stating that one must not enter the monastery but go into the 
world. This phrase will be carried on throughout the journals and even in the Postscript 
and Fragment. The monk does not live in the world attempting to shine a light for those 
who think they know Christ, but instead lives in the monastery to exchange inwardness 
for outwardness: 
"Meanwhile I willingly concede the dubiousness of the monastic 
movement, for it went too far in externalizing what ought to be inward; 
but then, instead of comprehending the dubiousness and rejoicing in the 






Kierkegaard's discontent with monks is that he thinks that they take their 
relationship with God and make it outwardly focused. While it seems that they may be 
following God, their inward relationship with God might be lacking or dead. Monks may 
never have appeared as nominal Christians, but they certainly came off as desirous of 
praise to Kierkegaard as he says, "to get mediation established in the place of honors 
makes a poor solution." 
In his journals between the Fragment and the Postscript, Kierkegaard's antipathy 
toward the monastic movement is developing more and more. While there are many 
examples of his hatred, 56 he references The Ladder in 1849: "the actual Johannes 
Climacus (author of Scala Paradisi) says: There are-but few saints; ifwe wish to become 
saintly and saved, we must live as do the few." 57 It is cle_ar throughout his years as a 
student to his years as an author, The Ladder and the idea of the monastic life influenced 
him somewhat. Next, I will examine the similar literary themes between Climacus' and 
Klimakos' works. 
An Interlocutor and Demons 
At the end of every chapter of the Fragment, excluding the "Interlude"-the most 
philosophical section of the work-Climacus quarrels with a persona over his plagiarism 
of the gospel story.58 The unnamed interlocutor complains that Climacus is trying to 
make the doctrine of the incarnation become new again by retelling the gospel in a more· 
complicated, confusing, and philosophical way. Each statement begins: "Now if someone 
56 The most fully developed, which includes reference to Johannes Climacus, is found in JP 6475. 
57ff~~ . 
58 PF21-22, 35-36, 46-47, 53-54, 68-71, 105-110. 
14 
were to say," 59 and involves some sort oflampooning ofClimacus: "You talk as if you 
were defending a doctoral dissertation ... you have introduced words that do not belong 
to you ... "60 In all the Kierkegaardian corpus, this interlocutor only appears in the 
Fragment. 
Twice in the Ladder, there is an appearance of some sort of demon interlocutor. In 
Step 15, "On Chastity", one of the longest and most detailed chapters, Klimakos, at the 
end, states: "What is this mystery in me? What is the principle of this mixture of body 
and soul? How can I be my own friend and my own enemy? Speak to me! Speak to me, 
my yoke-fellow, my nature!" 61 It appears that there is some struggle, if not with an actual 
demon, then with Klimakos' own body (i.e. yoke fellow or nature). This spirit is 
described in-depth later in "On Sensitivity": 
"That is why this tyrannical evildoer said this to me: 'Those who are under 
my sway laugh when they see the bodies of the dead. At prayer they are 
stony, hard, and blinded. In front of the altar they feel nothing. They 
receive the Holy Gift as if it were ordinary bread ... "' 62 
The demon, like Climacus' interlocutor, is lampooning the monk's efforts toward 
sanctification and salvation, insofar as the evildoer actually mocks and criticizes those 
that receive communion and pray. Klimakos, like Climacus, constructs an interlocutor to 
invite their reader to a greater conviction for not taking Christianity seriously. 
59 PF 35. 
60 PF66 
61 Ladder 186. 
62 Ladder 192. 
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It is important to recall Climacus' question at the beginning of the book. He 
wonders if a historical event can provide a source for eternal happiness. Obviously he 
thinks it can, but he constructs an interlocutor for the sake of demonstrating the simplicity 
and 'plagiarism' 63 of statements from the Gospels. Even though the interlocutor brings 
multiple complaints against Climacus, he, in fact, brings attention to Climacus' desires: 
to slowly take away the seeming simplicity of Christianity and further complicate it. The 
. interlocutor, then, creates greater inward reflection for the nominal Christian reader (i.e. 
Kierkegaard's audience) by mimicking their own voice. If the reader finds themselves 
following the interlocutor and not Climacus, they have missed the moment to realize the 
ultimate paradox of Christianity (the incarnation), and thus the moment does not have 
decisive significance for them. 
Klimakos may have a more pastoral intent in constructing a demonic dialogue-
or he is reiterating an actual experience with a demon, which would not be uncommon 
given that mention of demonic influence is abundant in the Ladder. Communicating with 
this interlocutor serves two purposes. The first is empathy with the monk. By mentioning 
a demonic struggle in the most developed step, "On Chastity" shows great understanding 
of common monastic struggles, like masturbation and untempered sexual desires. Second, 
in the step "On Sensitivity", which addresses monks' lack of empathy towards people, 
the interlocutor plays a condemning role. It encourages them to consider the sacrament as 
more than just eating ordinary bread. It is one thing to have a strict monastic father call 
out sin, but another to have a demon jest at monastic efforts. 
63 ;,What you are composing is the shabbiest plagiarism ever to appear." PF 35 
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Looking more closely at the texts, there are three passages in the Ladder where 
Klimakos does not condone Climacus' actions, but condemns them. Klimakos himself 
shares with Climacus' interlocutor common complaints against philosophers: 
"The insensitive man is a foolish philosopher, an exegete condenmed by 
his own words, a scholar who contradicts himself, a blind man teaching 
sight to others. "64 
"A man who takes pride in natural abilities-- I mean cleverness, the ability 
to learn, skill in reading, good diction, quick grasp, and all such skills as 
we possess without having to work for them-- this man, I say, will never 
receive the blessings of heaven, since the man who is unfaithful in little is 
unfaithful and vainglorious in much. "65 
"There are not many outstanding experts in worldly philosophy." 66 
Kierkegaard's Climacus' interlocutor mimics Klimakos himself. The 
passages below represent the same complaints as the ones above. Climacus' 
interlocutor states what is said above: Climacus is a foolish philosopher, he 
speaks in complicated ways even though he repeats a simple truth, and he, like 
any other unsuccessful worldly philosopher, says nothing new: 
"But you, on the other hand, are behaving like a vagabond who charges a 
fee for showing an area that everyone can see. "67 
64 Ladder 19 I 
65 Ladder 204 
66 Ladder 269 
67 PF21 
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"You talk as if you were defending a doctoral dissertation-- indeed, you 
talk like a book and what is unfortunate for you, like a very specific 
book." 68 
"What you are composing is the shabbiest plagiarism ever to appear, since 
it is nothing more or less than what any child knows." 69 
The interlocutor's attacks against Climacus are extremely similar, if not the same 
as, the complaints Klimakos has against philosophers and scholars. Klimakos states three 
facts: an insensitive man is a foolish philosopher, a man who takes pride in his natural 
abilities (i.e. writing well) will not receive the blessings of heaven, and there are not 
many experts in philosophy. Climacus' interlocutor, while nagging Climacus, mimics 
these claims' forms: Climacus is a sophist (i.e. insensitive), his speech is pedantic, and 
his unsuccessful worldly philosophy is the shabbiest plagiarism, nothing more or less 
than what a child knows. 
The significance of these similarities can be expounded by one fact. The 
mentioned quotes from the Ladder are the only references to a philosophical term 
throughout the work. While there is general libel against any underwhelming philosopher 
that Kierkegaard could have put in the mouth of Climacus' interlocutor, I find it more 
reasonable to believe that it came from Klimakos' Ladder. The interlocutor's purposes 
and the relation amongst the quotes above shows Klimakos' influence on Climacus. 
One of the influences Klimakos' has on Climacus is in suggesting an interlocutor 
that condemns and causes reflections in his readers. For Klimakos, it is to convict monks 
68 PF68 
69 PFi 35 
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of their lackluster discipline. For Climacus, it is to encourage Christians to take the 
incarnation far more seriously. Climacus is so influenced by Klimakos that he takes 
Klimakos' complaints against philosophers and puts them in the mouth of his 
interlocutor. 
Humility: Epistemic and Virtue 
Though the term is not used explicitly throughout the Fragment, there is a running 
of theme of epistemic humility. In short, epistemic humility is Socratic wisdom, knowing 
that one does not know. To elaborate, epistemic humility is accepting that one is untruth. 
One does not discover one's untruth until the teacher reveals the consciousness of sin and 
the sinner converts through accepting the incaruation. Climacus sums up the difficulty of 
epistemic humility in "The God as Teacher and Savior (A Poetical Venture)": 
"But that which makes understanding so difficult is precisely this: that he 
becomes nothing and yet is not armihilated; that he owes him everything 
and yet becomes boldly confident; that he understands the truth but the 
truth makes him free; that he grasps the guilt of untruth, and then again 
bold confidence triumph in the truth." 70 
If every desire wills its own downfall, as Climacus says, then the ultimate paradox of 
thought is to think something that carmot be thought. 71 However, humans, by their own nature, 
cannot think the unthinkable. However, they know that there is something unthinkable that no 
one has thought, yet they convince themselves that they can be the one to think it. Climacus 
states that this process, this paradoxical passion of the understanding 72, collides with the 
70PF31. 




unknown, with the result that the understanding knows the unknown exists. Human 
understanding, though, does not know how to know it. The thinker, thinking they have thought 
something different, really only thinks the difference in themself. 73 This leads Climacus to 
conclude that man needs the god74 to come to know that the god is different, 75 and this difference 
(i.e. separation) is sin. 76 
Klimakos, unlike Climacus, states multiple times that the reader must banish vainglory, 77 
along with pride, and embrace humility. 78 Vainglory is a perversion of character that is 
determined by a waste of work and a betrayal of treasure. 79 Pride is the denial of God which 
mocks neighbors and parades achievements. 80 Humility is encouraged in the beginning, 81 
necessary for salvation, 82 and can only be defined as a gift from God. 83 If a monk finds worth in 
any of their deeds, vainglory and pride willrnise their heads. To contrast, if delight is found in 
the salvation and love of Jesus Christ, all virtues will be exemplified. 
At face value, the works appear to be recommending different virtues. Climacus states 
that one must accept that the paradox is revealed (not thought) 84 to them and Klimakos says that 
virtue comes from God (not from themselves). However, each humility, whether epistemic or 
73 PF 45. They think they have thought something different when really they have not. 
74 Lee C. Barrett, "Johannes Climacus: Humorist, Dialectician, and Gadfly,"122 summarizes this nicely: "Climacus 
talks of"paradox" in order to provoke the reader to consider the possibility that one aspect of our dependence on 
God is the inadequacy of our own cognitive powers." 
75 PF46. 
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77 Ladder 83, I 02, 158, 201-202 "On Vainglory", etc. 
78 Ladder 96, 107, 218-219 "On Humility", etc. 
79 Ladder 201. 
80 Ladder 207. 
81 Ladder 76. 
82 Ladder 209. 
83 Ladder 219. 
84 Jamie M. Ferreira, Kierkegaard, 72, states, "The "thought project is a pedagogical tool .. the reader needs to see 
for himself how a rational and revealed religion differ." 
virtuous, is necessary for one to find and experience God. Climacus even goes so far as to state 
that one cannot prove the existence of God. 85 Why? Because then the proof of God would only 
serve one's ego and not bring them to God. Klimakos at the beginning of his step on humility 
says the same things: 
"Do you imagine that plain words can precisely or truly or appropriately or 
clearly or sincerely describe the love of the Lord .. .If you think so, then you will 
be like a man who with words and examples tries to convey the sweetness of 
honey to people who have never tasted it. ... A man stands revealed as either 
having had no experience of what he is talking about or as having fallen into the 
grip ofvainglory." 86 
This demonstrates that true humility, to Klimakos, is not just an emotional state 
that comes from letting go of prideful acts but a recognition that one cannot appropriately 
desfribe God with words. One either must have experienced God oneself or deluded 
oneself into vainglory. Kierkegaard through Climacus says something very similar: 
"For the fool says in his heart that there is no God, but he who says in his heart or 
to others: just wait a little and I shall demonstrate it-- ah, what a rare wise man he 
is! If, at the moment he is supposed to begin the demonstration, it is not totally 
undecided whether the god exists or not, then, of course, he does not demonstrate 
it ... He constantly presupposes that the god exists, and on this presupposition he 
seeks to infuse nature with the idea of fitness and purposiveness." 87 
85 PF 44 "He constantly presupposes that the god exists, and on this presupposition he seeks to infuse nature with 
the idea of fitness and purposiveness. 
86 Ladder 218 
87 PF 43 
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While it's obvious that Kierkegaard thinks God exists; the humorist finds himself 
in the same position as the monk. Both think that god must be experienced. Klimakos 
says that plain words and examples cannot accurately describe the love of the lord, 
especially to those who have never 'tasted' (i.e. experienced it). Climacus says that any 
manner of syllogism or argument (i.e. an example) only presupposes God's existence for 
the purpose of infusing nature with the idea of fitness and purposiveness. Climacus and 
Klimakos are on the same epistemological. foot when it comes to knowing or describing 
God: one must be humble and experience Him. 
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Kierkegaard could have been inspired by other sources to make Climacus write that one 
cannot prove God, but I believe it is shown above that Climacus displays similar strands of 
thought with Klimakos concerning epistemic humility. Both necessitate that humility is 
necessary to encounter God or the god. One will call this encounter a contest and the other will 
call it a moment. Both think that the experiences come about by a leap. 
A Moment 
Throughout the Kierkegaardian corpus there is an idea of the moment. It is found in the 
journals, in Fear and Trembling, and in the works written by Climacus. In the Fragment itself, 
Climacus gives multiple definitions of the moment, but essentially it is the point in time where 
the eternal/infinite enters the learner and casts the learner away from untruth. Or, in 
Kierkegaard's words: "The moment emerges precisely in the relation of the eternal resolution to 
the unequal occasion. "88 The moment involves a leap from one's own rational thought to an 
infinite being that rational thought cannot understand (i.e. epistemic humility). 89 
88 PF25 
89 Jean-Marie Vivaldi, Kierkegaard: History and Eternal Happiness, (Lanham: University Press of America, 2008), 
41, defines the leap as a "sudden interruption of the conceptualization process ofrationality." 
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Ware states that even though Klimakos' steps seem obscure, his intention is "to provoke 
the reader into a leap of faith, to bring him to a moment of personal encounter." 90 As seen above, 
Klimakos' self-stated mission is to bring his reader to an "easy-contest" so a "non-n,iaterial flame 
may take up residence within them." 91 Conquering _each rung on the ladder may manifest as a to-
do list for the monastic reader, but the intention is to provide an individual moment to .experience 
God. 
Although Kierkegaard has clearly developed the idea of a leap of faith without the 
assistance ofKlimakos, 'the moment' is mentioned so many times.in the Fragment it appears 
that it carries the same goal as Klimakos' work. Climacus, according to the questions listed on 
the title of his work, is immensely interested in discovering the moment. Throughout his work he 
negates possible solutions to the learner's paradox and continues to search for the moment with 
decisive significance. 92 The learner carmot understand the paradox by only seeing the teacher. If 
one only observed the incarnation, the moment would not have decisive significance. The learner 
cannot just be given material gain to comprehend the paradox. Why? The moment would not 
have decisive significance. This is displayed throughout the Fragment. Furthermore, if what 
Ware says is true, then Klimakos' goal is the same as Climacus': namely, to provide the reader 
with the moment to encounter God. 93 
Klimakos does not explicitly mention anywhere in the Ladder an idea like Kierkegaard's 
idea of 'the moment', but there is one passage that stands out in Climacus' Fragment that 
resonates specifically with the Ladder: 
90 Ladder 10. 
91 Ladder 71. 
92 PF30 
93 Jamie M. Ferreira, Kierkegaard, 78, has similar thoughts when she states, "Kierkegaard and Climacus can both be 
seen as providing an "occasion" for their readers." 
"Yet this letting go, even that is surely something; it is, after all, meine Zuthat 
[my contribution]. Does it not have to be taken into account, this diminutive 
moment, however brief it is-- it does not have to be long, because it is a leap . .. 
that the existence itself emerges from the demonstration by a leap) proves 
something else instead ... "94 
Here Climacus likens the moment to a leap, something that Klimakos demands 
with an imperative verb at the beginning of his book. The leap, to Climacus, is the 
moment where the god is demonstrated. The existence of God must be proven in the 
moment by the leap or something else has been demonstrated that "perhaps did not even 
need demonstrating, and in any case never anything better." 95 The leap is also a letting 
go,. what Climacus calls his contribution. Climacus' contribution copies Klimakos' 
imperative: "leap, as it were, into a fire." 96 Both leaps are meant to be decisive. The 
humorist wants the moment to have significance and the monk wants the spiritual flame 
to become a bonfire. 
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Climacus' use of the moment is similar to Klimakos', thus showing some influence. Both 
write works that have the goal of preparing their reader to either understand or experience a 
moment with God. Both use the concept of the leap once in their works to describe a moment of 
conversion. But, how is this done? Do they give terms and definitions in hope that the reader 
will understand? Do they demand that the reader do as they do? As it turns out, how something is 
said is just as important as what is being said for achieving their purpose. 
94 PF43 
95 PF 43 
96 Ladder 76 
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Indirect Communication 
Indirect connnunication is simply saying something without directly stating it. Golomb 
beautifully illustrates this with Kierkegaard. One does not convince somebody to love them but 
entices them. Kierkegaard then, instead of using rational and direct arguments, attempts to solve 
semantic problems (i.e. agreeing on the definition of a term) and achieves a pragmatic objective 
through connnitted passionate actions.97 Similarly, Climacus knows that his audience will resist a 
didactic form of teaching. So he presents Orthodox Christian beliefs in a new form so that they 
may become meaningful to the readers, who at the time of the Fragment's writing saw the 
orthodox dogmas as nothing but pure information.98 In Kierkegaard's mind, religious practices 
are corrupted by social conventionalism and crude connnercialism, which causes them to lack 
spiritual focus. However, telling this to another is not easy, as it leaves no direct instruction for 
escape.99 How does indirect communication relate to Climacus and Klimakos? 
The former cannot simply state Christian beliefs to his audience. They all think that they 
are already Christian. There is no use in this. The latter is also put in a place where simply stating 
what a monk ought to do is without purpose. Young monks know they have not come close to 
God, since that is why they are in the monastery to begin with. So, what ought both to do? 
Mooney states that the ethicoreligious individual-which is what Climacus is qua being a self-
titled humorist-is an exemplar of truth more than a truth teller. The individual stands for 
something that cannot be told. 100 
97 Jacob Golomb, "Kierkegaard's Ironic Ladder to Autheniic Faith," International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 
32, no. 2 (1992): 69, doi:10.1007/bfDl315425. 
98Stephen Mulhall, "God's Plagiarist: The Philosophical Fragments of Johannes Climacus," Philosophical 
Investigations 22, no. I (I 999): I, accessed March 31, 2018, Academic Search Premier, EBSCOhost. 
99Edward F. Mooney,"Exemplars, Inwardness, and Belief: Kierkegaard on Indirect Communication in International 
Kierkegaard Commentary Concluding Unscientific Postscript to "Philosophical Fragments," ed. by Robert L. 
Perkins, (Macon: Mercer University Press, 1997,) 130. 
JOO Edward F. Mooney"Exemplars, Inwardness, and Belief: Kierkegaard on Indirect Communication, 142. 
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Climacus, rather than stating what Christianity is, begins by questioning the doctrines of 
Christianity: "Can a historical point of departure be given for an eternal happiness?" Then 
throughout the Fragment he retells the incarnation in a variety of different ways to show the 
reader not only the absurdity, but the beauty of it. For example, in chapter two Climacus gives an 
example of an unhappy king hoping to please a girl he loved. Showering her with gifts and 
positional status would do no good because "he did not want his own glorification but the 
girl's". 101 Climacus concludes that if the god cannot bring about equal love with the learner by 
ascent, than descent must do, 102 for one only loves "the omnipotent one who performs miracles, 
not him who humbled himself in equality." 103 In essence, Climacus is indirectly saying to his 
nominal Christian readers, "Love God not because what he has given you, but because what he 
has done." Later, Climacus describes the person who receives the condition (salvation) 
personally from the god, is the one who believes in the god. It is not one who thinks that there 
are many good honest people or has seen the historical Christ. 104 Once again Climacus is trying 
to retell basic Christian doctrine indirectly to convince and persuade his readers. 
Klimakos, in a different situation, employs indirect communication too. Like Climacus, 
he employs a range of tactics, from telling of dispassionate, fasting monks, to personifying sins 
and telling personal stories of encounters with monks who have fallen short on the ladder. Ware 
says that true appreciation of the Ladder "is to recognize throughout its pages a dialectical 
approach." 105 Klimakos is not going to tell the young monks how to experience God but rather 
show them what it is like to· experience God. In "On Penitence" Klimakos recounts seeing monks 
IOI PF29. 
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who have fallen but "are more blessed than those who have never fallen and who do not have to 
mourn over themselves, because ... they have pulled themselves up by a sure resurrection." 106 
Instead of telling monks to be repentant, he shows them that being repentant leads to a greater 
glory, or sureness in the resurrection of Christ. He does not hold judgment over them through 
telling, but offers, indirectly, a better solution to experiencing God through showing. 
Seeing indirect communication in both of the works alone is not sufficient to verify the 
claim that Klimakos influenced Climacus. Taken with the other three discussed similarities and 
recognizing that similar goals are fulfilled by indirect communication, it strengthens the 
argument that Klimakos influenced Climacus. Kierkegaard's Climacus is impacted by the 
ethicoreligious monk Klimakos. Both share the theme of communicating indirectly to their 
readers to entice them to a greater truth. However, at face value, it seems like how each reach 
that truth is different. Climacus heavily emphasizes that the conversion is a moment, whereas 
Klimakos states that conversion is a process. 
An Awkward Conflict in Salvation? 
So far I have used four literary themes that show that Climacus was impacted by 
Klimakos: the constructed interlocutor, moment, epistemic humility, and indirect 
communication. However, a brief reading of the works would lead a reader to see a conflict 
about salvation. Climacus' salvation is a moment. It is a connection between the finite and 
infinite in time producing an eternal happiness. To reiterate, it happens instantly. Klirnakos, on 
the other hand, appears to offer a process of salvation. That is, by climbing the rungs of the 
ladder and completing each step one continues to be saved and experiences God. It appears that 
106 Ladder 128. 
the pseudonym and the real person disagree with one another. However, a close reading and 
analysis of Climacus' and Klimakos' works reveals something else. 
Klimakos throughout the Ladder displays steps that ought to be completed in order to 
continue towards God. But, just before chapter 27, he makes some interesting claims that 
complicate the matter. Klimakos has been building a ladder to reach God for twenty six steps, 
but then appear three claims: 
"A strong faith is the mother of renunciation. The opposite of thls is quite evident. 
Unswerving hope is the gateway to detachment. The opposite ofthls is perfectly 
obvious. Love of God is the foundation of exile. The opposite of this is quite 
evident." 107 
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Echoing Paul's exhortation in I Corinthlans 13:13, Klimakos is making an interesting claim 
about the perceived steps of the ladder. The first three steps are titled "On Renunciation of Life," 
"On Detachment," and "On Exile." The last step is "On Faith, Hope, and Love". Thus, 
completing the last step will fulfill the first three. If this is so, then the ladder does not begin at 
step one but at step thirty. Klimakos' approach to salvation does not seem so apparent now. Ware 
fully agrees when he states that Klimakos' goal is not "to inculcate abstract teaching or to impose 
a formal code of ascetic rules, but to evoke in his readers an experience similar to his.own." 108 
Seeing the Ladder as a set of rules to follow in order to achieve salvation is a simplistic reading 
at best. 
Climacus presents something similar to Paul's journey to Damascus: an instant 
interaction with God. There is no process. There are no steps and stages. It is only God, reaching 
107 Ladder 282 
108 Ladder 8 
down, and revealing himself to man, the learner. But, in the last pages, interacting with the 
interlocutor again, Climacus reveals something: 
" .. .in the next section of this pamphlet, ifl ever do write it, I intend to call the 
matter by its proper name and clothe the issue in historical costume. If I ever do 
write a second section-- because a pamphlet writer such as I am has no 
seriousness ... Yet it is not difficult to perceive what the historical costume of the 
next section will be." 109 
Climacus in the Fragment has asked what Christianity is, or even whether 
Christianity is possible. In the Postscript, he asks, "How can I become a Christian?" 
Establishing the 'what' of Christianity (the incarnation) he clothes the question in asking 
how one believes in .it. It appears then that the so-called moment is not sufficient for 
salvation either. 11° Climacus finds himself in the same places as Klimakos, seeming to 
con!radict his soteriology by offering something different at the end than what he 
portrayed throughout the book. 
As emphasized in the section addressing the moment, both works desire to bring 
the reader to an encounter with God, regardless of their face-value soteriology. More 
specifically, both works present a more complicated soteriology than what a basic 
reading reveals. Klimakos creates a ladder the reader will have to take step-by-step, but 
he then says that the first three steps are fulfilled by the last. Climacus necessitates 
repeatedly throughout his work that the moment must be decisive for one to know God. 
I09 PF 109 
29 
110 Space will not permit me to write upon Klimakos influence in the Postscript: concentration on death, 
renunciation of everything (CUP 404), resignation, suffering, and guilt as pathological growth, and ironic references 
claiming Climacus is not a monk ("!fl had lived in Middle Ages, I could never have resolved to choose the 
monastery. CUP 415) with constant belittlement of outwardness lacking inwardness. 
However, he says that he must clothe the issue in historical costume. Observing the 
similarities above, I conclude that Klimakos did impact Climacus. Now, how can the 
Fragment be read more richly and how should Climacus and Kierkegaard be interpreted? 
Rereading Climacus, Seeing Kierkegaard 
Given what is argued above, it seems that Climacus relies on Klimakos for some 
portion of his literary themes. Referencing the monk, it is not unreasonable to claim that 
he has similar goals as the monastic father. Possibly, he can be seen as a teacher to those 
philosophers who are on the wrong path. Since he was on the wrong path in De Omnibus, 
he has legitimacy to teach those walking on it. He is a humorist knowing his, and the 
world's, brokenness, so he is apt to teach those who do not. 111 Muench argues that his 
audience is of a Hegelian nature and the point of his writing is to remind him or her of a 
different philosophy, a philosophy focused on reflection. 112 Climacus, just like Klimakos, 
insists that faith cannot come by second-hand, thus, he can be understood as providing an 
occasion to experience salvation for his readers. 113 
At face value, his Fragment appears only as a short philosophical pamphlet intent 
on complicating Christianity. But his desire is to "unstuffthe mouth that is so full of food 
that for this reason he cannot eat ... " 114 Evans even argues that the Fragment could 
. possibly be read as an apologetic text for "when hu)11an reason pronounces that it cannot 
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Postscript."" 11.eligious Studies, 33, no. 2 (1997): 195, accessed March 27, 2018, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/20008090. says,"The humorist has an intellectual understanding that suffering is 
essential to human existence, but when he suffers it he does not want to experience it." 
112 Muench, Paul. "Understanding Kierkegaard's Johannes Climacus in the Postscript," 32. 
113 Jamie M. Ferreira, Kierkegaard, 78. 
114 CUP 275 
make sense of the incarnation, this is precisely what one would expect if the incarnation 
were a divine revelation. "115 Climacus is not far off from a monk trying to teach others 
the path to God. Bechtol states that Climacus wants to assure his readers that human 
knowledge is not helpful for coming into relation with the object of Christian faith and 
knowledge: the incarnation. 116 Climacus, in a sense is a modern monk and the Fragment 
is a piece, which deliberately brings people to the moment. 
Up until now, I have not defined a monk. There are many roles that monks live 
out, and, as seen in the journals, Kierkegaard himself seems to have disagreed with a lot 
of them. However, the fact remains that his pseudonym Johannes Climacus, who detests 
the monastic movement in the Concluding Unscientific Postscript, pays homage to a very 
influential monastic father. Defining a monk in traditional terms may not be fitting for the 
definition that Kierkegaard has in mind. A monk, as it appears in the Fragment and 
Ladder above, is someone who leads others to a moment of experiencing God. Climacus 
does this through philosophical reflections while Klimakos creates a ladder made up of 
pious duties. Where does Kierkegaard, the creator of Climacus and reader of Klimakos, , 
fit in? While observing the influence of Klimakos on Climacus, how should one see 
Kierekegaard? 
Ferreira, Lowrie, and the Hong's have all attested that researchers found a 
physical copy of Philosophical Fragments signed by S. Kierkegaard from the day before 
it went to the printers. 117 The shift from S. Kierkegaard to Johannes Climacus appears to 
115Stephen C. Evans, "Apologetic Argwnents in Kierkegaard's Philosophical Fragments," in International 
Kierkegaard Commentary Philosophical Fragments, ed. by Robert L. Perkins, (Macon: Mercer University Press, 
1994,) 69. 
116Harris B. Bechtol, "Paul and Kierkegaard: A Christocentric Epistemology," The Heythrop Journal 55, no. 5 
(2011): 930, doi: I 0.ll l l/j.1468-2265.2011.00713.x. 
117Jarnire M. Ferreira, Kierkegaard, 9. 
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be a last-minute change. If this is true, then one could say Kierkegaard did not explicitly 
have Klimakos on his mind while writing the Fragment. However, another interpretation 
is that Kierkegaard, upon finishing the Fragment, tacks on Climacus because the 
Fragment shares themes with Klimakos' Ladder. I agree with Ferreira that no one can 
know for sure why the change was made, 118 but I do think that the name change bears 
evidence that Kierkegaard himself shares similarities with Johannes Climacus. For ifhe 
was writing with his name in mind the whole time, and then changed it to Climacus, he 
obviously thinks that his own thoughts are common enough with his pseudonyms. Like 
Climacus, Kierkegaard, can be seen as a monk. 
Kierkegaard's interest is in how to become a Christian.in Christendom. 119 He 
had a religious mission (like a monk) 120, and invited his readers to be individuals so that 
they could reintroduce Christianity into Denmark. 121 In his journals, he stronglyagrees 
with Climacus. 122 Climacus can be seen as a monastic teacher to nominal Christians, and 
Kierkegaard had a desire to condenm nominal Christians. Some have even argued that 
Climacus was a mouthpiece for Kierkegaard. 123 Kierkegaard's two most influential and 
potent philosophical works were written by a pseudonym with whom he shares many 
beliefs. Therefore, Kierkegaard, sharing similarities with Climacus who was influenced 
118 Ibid. 9. 
119 William Mcdonald, "S0ren Kierkegaard," in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, November 10, 2017 and 
accessed November 12, 20 I 8, https:/ /piato.stanford.edu/entries/kierkegaard/. 
120 Alastair Hannay and Gordon Daniel Marino, The Cambridge Companion to Kierkegaard (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998), 3. 
121Patrick Sheil, Starting with Kierkegaard, (London: Continuum, 2011), 6. 
122 JP 569, 1174, 4550, 6475, 6558. 
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123 Niels Thulstrup, Introduction to Philosophical Fragments, translated by David Swenson, revised by Howard 
Hong, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962, p. lxxxv) says that Climacus "cannot be considered a truly 
pseudonymous work .... [O]ne will find hardly any inconsistency between his work and other private and published 
thought and writings." 
by Klimakos, can further be viewed as a modem monk hoping to lead Christians to true 
Christianity. 
Conclusion 
Although the Fragment of Philosophy and Ladder of Divine Ascent are separated 
by over one thousand years, I have surveyed an abundance of evidence showing that 
Kierkegaard was influenced by the latter, and that it heavily impacted his pseudonym 
Johannes Climacus. Recognizing the similarities in the works, one can read the Fragment 
as a work aimed at leading the reader to an opportunity to experience God. Finally, 
Climacus, a humorist, dialectician, and Socratic figure, can now be seen as a monk 
leading nominal Christians into a true experience with God. Kierkegaard, being in 
likeness with Climacus, can also be seen as the modem monk of Copenhagen, using his 
works to bring Christianity back into Christendom. 
33 
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Reflection 
Over the course of.two years I worked on my Honors capstone. The major I choose to 
focus in was not classics, or communication studies, but philosophy. The capstone was a great 
experience that pushed me to my limit on research, communication with my mentor, and writing 
capabilities. While it was a beneficial experience, there were some parts that became extremely 
frustrating: communicating with my mentor, finding secondary sources, and redrafting my paper. 
Other parts were exhilarating: talking with various professors in the field I studied, finding good 
sources in the secondary literature, realizing that I was the first one to write on the topic. 
Although I can only see some small effects that the capstone has on me now ( e.g. greater 
appreciation for research and an.increased capability in writing) I hope to see more fruits of the 
project down the road. From what I can tell, the capstone experience has taught me a different 
way to work hard, broadened my experience across my other disciplines (i.e. classics and 
communication studies), and instilled in me an evaluation method of mentor relationships. 
I began to work on what would be my capstone as a junior when I read Philosophical 
Fragments and The Ladder of Divine Ascent with my soon to be mentor, Dr. Richard Sherlock. I 
was fascinated by what Soren Kierkegaard's pseudonyms Johannes Climacus said. What was 
even more appealing was what St. John Klimakos said in the The Ladder. I loved what I was 
reading and immensely enjoyed the relationship I had with Dr. Sherlock. So, nearing my last 
summer at Utah State University, I decided to write my capstone on the relationship between The 
Ladder and the The Fragment. At the same time the project was decided, it opened up a lot more 
work to do. 
The first semester of my senior year I found myself absolutely slammed with reading. My 
goal was to read Johannes Climacus' second work, Concluding Unscientific Postscript to the 
Philosophical Fragment (a 700 page philosophical behemoth), and collect all ofmy secondary 
articles. There were two things that became very apparent to me: 1) I am an extremely slow 
reader and 2) there is an abundance of "secondary literature", and while all articles may be 
interesting not all are very useful. Each week I put in hours of work with my nose shoved in the 
CUP or on JSTOR trying to find articles. Some days it felt like I was wading through the muck 
of useless scholarship, but there were other times when I discovered a gold mine. About halfway 
through the semester I found two books that contained collections of major essays on 
Kierkegaard's PF and CUP. At the same time of finding those, I developed a pattern to help me 
read faster and parse information more efficiently. 
While the above portion summarizes the struggles in the first part of my senior year, and I 
am happy to say that all those were overcome, the second semester brought new problems. First, 
my relationship with my mentor dramatically diminished. Even though I sent him draft after 
draft, he did not read any of them nor respond back to my emails. I am very thankful for the 
other professors on my committee. If it wasn't for Dr. Kleiner and Dr. Huenemann reading 
through my first drafts, I do not think my thesis could have been finished. I am very thankful for 
the two's contributions, but there feedback was hard to take at times. I rewrote or reorganized my 
capstone multiple times. It felt mundane, repetitive, and useless. I know rereading, rewriting, and 
restructuring my thesis made it better, but it was difficult to say the least. 
For as many difficulties that had to be overcomed, there were more successes that 
encouraged me. One was talking to professors that attended other universities. Paul Muench 
wrote extensively on Johannes Climacus, so one day I called him. To my surprise he answered! 
After an one hour conversation he told me that no one had written on the topic I was pursuing. 
Later he gave me advice and recommended that I contact another professor at St. Olaf 
University. I was in absolute shock. One day I was struggling to get a foothold in the secondary 
research, and then another day I was talking to a current Kierkegaard scholar from the comfort of 
the Quad's bench. That phone call gave me hope in future research projects. Before I thought I 
was all alone, but I was reassured that other academics were there to help. 
I may not have had to have gone through as many secondary sources as other students, 
but it felt like a lot to me. From biographies on Kierkegaard's life, to whole books dedicated to 
dissecting his pseudonym, there were few things that related to my thesis. However, when I 
found source that I could use, it was so exciting and encouraging that it gave me the confidence 
to look for more sources. For some writing might be the funnest part, but I found a great 
enj qyment in reading what other people had already written. 
Throughout my undergraduate career I never have been pushed by something as hard as 
the Honors capstone. Leaming greek and latin were difficult, but that process mainly consisted of 
memorizing paradigms, rules, and vocabulary words. During the capstone I felt like I was on my 
toes the whole time. Everything was new: reading philosophy not for pleasure, but for research, 
tracking down my next secondary source, searching through the footnotes, combining all my 
notes and thoughts to write what I thought my data best represented. The hard work I 
experienced combined rigorous reading, dutiful searching, and a creative writing synthesis of the 
two. 
Late in the writing stage of my capstone, I realized how much my work crossed over into 
my others majors. For example, one of the points in my papers was on indirect communication, 
something that directly relates to one of my minors. At another point in the project, I noticed that 
my latin and greek language learning helped tremendously because I could understand who 
Kierkegaard read, why he had read them, and why he was quoting them in his works. My 
classical and communication studies background prepared me for my philosophy capstone. 
Likewise, my philosophy capstone showed me how holistic my degree was. 
Finally, due to the poor quality of mentor experience, in the future I will be more critical 
of who I choose to mentor me and of who I choose to mentor. Even though the mentorship 
experience was positive at the beginning, it became extremely lackluster and similar to pulling 
teeth near the end. From now on I would like to establish a contract with my future academic 
mentors stating what their expectations are of me and what my expectations are of them. I think 
doing this will show the seriousness of our commitment and be beneficial to the purpose of the 
relationship. For future honor students, I highly recommend establishing boundaries and goals 
with their capstone mentor. 
The honors capstone was a great experience that pushed me both academically and 
relationally. I would do it again in a heartbeat because I am extremely thankful of the critical 
thinking, writing, and communicative skills it gave me. Also, I am excited to see how this 
experience plays out in my future research projects, whether they are done with an institution or 
in my private leisure. 
